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abstract
Since the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreements, the US dollar has 
formed the central axis of the International Monetary System (IMS). Howev-
er, is this hegemonic situation sustainable in the medium to long term? This 
study seeks to answer that question using a prospective approach based on 
the Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs) underlying Complexity Economics. The 
greatest danger facing the current IMS as a CAS lies in its endogenous evolu-
tion. The modern Triffin dilemma and a tendency towards multipolarity in the 
economic system –as opposed to the continued unipolarity of the monetary 
system– make it essential to adapt the system. However, no such adaptation is 
currently taking place. Thus, with no need for any external shock, the very na-
ture of the IMS leads to an eroding of confidence in the dollar in the medium/
long term. In order for the IMS to adapt and reconstruct itself, co-operation 
between interactive agents participating in the system is essential.
Keywords: International Monetary System; Monetary Unipolarity/Multipo-
larity; Triffin Dilemma; Complexity Economics; Complex Adaptive Systems.
resumen
Desde la firma de los acuerdos de Bretton Woods, el dólar ha constituido el 
eje central del Sistema Monetario Internacional. No obstante, ¿es esta hegem-
onía sostenible en el medio plazo? Este artículo trata de responder a la pre-
gunta utilizando un enfoque prospectivo basado en los Sistemas Adaptativos 
Complejos (SAC) de la Economía de la Complejidad. Si se observa el SMI como 
un SAC el mayor peligro deriva de su evolución endógena. El moderno dilema 
de Triffin y la tendencia hacia la multipolaridad en el sistema económico – 
como contraparte de la unipolaridad continuada del sistema monetario – hace 
necesaria una adaptación del sistema. En cualquier caso, dicha adaptación no 
se está produciendo. Así, sin necesidad de shocks externos, la propia natu-
raleza del SMI genera la erosión de la confianza en el dólar en medio y largo 
plazo. Es esencial la cooperación de los agentes interactivos que participan en 
el sistema para lograr la adaptación del SMI y su propia reconstrucción.
Palabras clave: Sistema Monetario Internacional; Unipolaridad/multipo-
laridad monetaria; Dilema de Triffin; Economía de la complejidad; Sistemas 
adaptativos complejos.
JEL Classification: F31, F33, F37.
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1. IntroDuctIon 
The United States dollar (USD) has clearly been at the centre of the Inter-
national Monetary System (IMS) since the signing of the Bretton Woods agree-
ments in 1944 led to the dollar acquiring a dominant role. When the first crisis 
of the dollar as a dominant currency broke out in 1971, the Treasury Secretary 
of the Nixon Administration, John Connally, addressed European leaders with 
this famous phrase: “the dollar is our currency, but your problem”. Those words 
are even truer today than they were then, as the message is now aimed not 
only at Europe but also at countries such as China, Japan and others with close 
links to the dollar. 
But is this dominant situation of the dollar sustainable in the medium/long 
term within the current IMS? The whole of the current IMS is based on con-
fidence in the dollar and a look forward reveals that two forces are coming 
to the fore, one in the medium term and the other in the long term, that are 
having a negative impact on that confidence: in the medium term, the US gov-
ernment will have to decide whether to issue more debt to meet international 
demand for dollars or to reduce it to improve its fiscal capacity. This conflict 
of economic interests that arises between short-term domestic and long-term 
international objectives is called the Triffin dilemma. In the long term, the clear 
trend towards multipolarity in the economic system may clash with the unipo-
larity of the monetary system. 
This article therefore seeks to provide a prospective approach to the IMS 
based on Complexity Economics. Current international economic decisions 
must be established under Knightian uncertainty conditions that are in need of 
metaheuristic approaches rather than traditional equilibrium models. The IMS 
is perfectly compatible with the characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems 
(CAS) that underpin Complexity Economics, including the presence of disperse 
and interactive agents, the lack of a global supervisor and ongoing adaptation 
of the system.
This manuscript contributes to the literature that questions the bases of 
the current IMS architecture. The practical implications of a possible shift in 
the current foundations of IMS decision-making are of the utmost importance. 
Any future change in the role of the USD as the backbone of the IMS would 
have very serious consequences as the stability and the smooth running of this 
system depend on international liquidity, sustainable growth of international 
trade, stability of international capital flows, the orderly correction of the bal-
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ance of payment problems of countries and a long list of dollar-dependent 
factors. It is therefore of vital importance to look to the future from a global 
perspective and a broad time frame so that the adaptation of the IMS can be 
proactive, planned, strategic and negotiated by a broad majority of countries 
to thus foster more balanced, more stable future international relations. By 
contrast, if the rethinking of the role of the USD is left until the next crisis, as it 
has been in the past, and action is then taken reactively to circumstances, we 
may face a real threat to the stability of international relations. 
From the start of the dominance of the USD following the Bretton Woods 
agreements, research into economic systems has fundamentally used general 
equilibrium economic models, from Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory to 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. They all coincide in the search 
for equilibrium, loss of which is always attributed to an external factor. The 
2008 crisis taught us that this is not necessarily the case and that the system 
itself can cause shocks due to its own internal dynamics (Minsky 1986, 2015). 
Complex Adaptive Systems are associated with out-of-equilibrium dynamics 
and the underlying framework Complexity Economics offers a previously un-
explored opportunity to adopt a prospective approach that can bring a new 
perspective into some decision-making problems in the international monetary 
field. This paper therefore addresses the issue from a new perspective capable 
of encompassing the new challenges of the IMS.
The article is organised as follows. Section two reviews the dominant role 
of the dollar within the IMS since the Bretton Woods Agreement and provides 
figures to show the current hegemony of the USD. Section three puts forward 
Complexity Economics as the methodological basis for the prospective ap-
proach. Section four develops the prospective approach in the medium and 
long terms. Based on this, section five proposes future actions focusing on 
working on monetary multipolarity proactively and on a cooperative basis. The 
article ends with the main conclusions.
2. the DomInant role of the USD In the InternatIonal monetary system
Its presence in international trade, its importance on the currency market 
(Forex), its use on financial markets, the level of reserves in the coffers of Cen-
tral Banks and its role as a standard asset for other currencies whose govern-
ments have opted to introduce a fixed exchange system are the main aspects 
taken into account when assessing the influence of each currency (Kenen, 
1983; Mazid et al., 2011). The dollar (USD), the euro (EUR), the yen (JPY), 
the pound sterling (GBP) and the yuan or renminbi (CNY) are at the forefront 
in that regard. All five have been assessed in a five-year review conducted by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016a) to identify and faithfully reflect 
the relative importance of the currencies selected for the basket of currencies 
that make up the special drawing rights (SDR). Those five currencies comprise 
93 per cent of world reserves (IMF, 2016b) and 86 per cent of the value of 
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international payments (SWIFT, 2015); furthermore around 79 per cent of the 
transactions on the FOREX market (BIS, 2016) are performed through them. 
In terms of economic importance, the countries that endorse them are respon-
sible for 70.77 per cent of global GDP (World Bank, 2016) and account for 
around 62 per cent of the world’s external debt (CIA, 2014). 
However, the USD dominates all essential aspects of the monetary sphere 
and has thus become the undisputed dominant currency (Figure 1). A radial 
comparison of these five currencies reveals the real competitive advantage of 
the dollar and its domination of all aspects of the IMS, far ahead of the euro, 
its closest competitor. 
fIgure 1. representatIon of the WeIghts of the maIn currencIes WIth InternatIonal status
 
Source: own elaboration based on data from IMF (2016a), World Bank (2016), SWIFT (2015), 
Triennial BIS Survey 2016 (2016) and DatosMacro (2016)
Note: For a better interpretation of this radial graph, we assume that the five currencies selected 
add up to 100% of each dimension
The USD currently accounts for 64 per cent of foreign currency reserves 
worldwide, followed by the euro (20.37 per cent), the pound (4.79 per cent), 
the yen (4.08 per cent) and, lagging far behind, the yuan (0.5 per cent), which 
is seeking to gain access to central bank reserves (IMF, 2016b). An initial step 
was taken in October 2016 when the Chinese currency was included in the 
basket of currencies known as special drawing rights issued by the IMF. 43.27 
per cent of international payments are made in dollars, 28.63 per cent in euros 
(though the euro has gradually lost market share since 2012), 9.02 per cent in 
pounds, 2.88 per cent in yen and 2.45 per cent in yuan (SWIFT, 2015).  This 
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last percentage has grown relatively quickly in recent years and, as Chinese 
trade is the largest in the world in terms of volume, its trend will be of great 
interest when determining the international status of the Chinese currency in 
the future. On the currency market (FOREX) 44 per cent of transactions were 
in USD, according to April 2016 figures submitted by the BIS in September 
that year. It was followed by the euro (15.5 per cent), the yen (11 per cent), the 
pound (6.5 per cent) and the yuan (2 per cent). 
It should be noted that the US government’s treasury debt is the largest in 
the world and it also has the largest number of bonds in circulation, facilitating 
dollar access for many countries with a trade surplus which wish to invest. The 
US economy is the most robust and the best suited to offering its currency as 
the backbone of the IMS. Furthermore, we must not overlook other aspects 
that are more difficult to quantify and in which the USD also excels. Those as-
pects include the fact that the dollar is the vehicle currency par excellence, that 
it generates global consensus regarding its use to anchor many fixed exchange 
rate systems and that key assets are denominated in dollars, with oil being the 
most important benchmark. Military security arising from geopolitics and not 
purely economic aspects is precisely why the six countries that make up the 
Gulf Cooperation Council are so closely linked to the dollar and so loyal to the 
US in its decisions (Momani, 2008).
However, strategic decisions regarding the international monetary system 
must not react to the current situation but rather to contingencies that may 
have to be faced in the future. The following section of this article therefore 
considers the framework within which not only the analysis of the current situ-
ation but also the concept of such future contingencies should be conducted.  
3. prospectIve approach of the InternatIonal monetary system: approach 
from complexIty economIcs
As noted in the previous section, the USD is undeniably the backbone of 
the current IMS. As the whole weight of the monetary system falls on a single 
country, the associated risks are on a huge scale, so we believe a “prospective 
approach” to the trend over time in the current design of the IMS structure 
to be essential. We have coined this term to meet the semantic needs arising 
from the innovative conceptual framework on which we base our work –Com-
plexity Economics (Arthur et al. 1997; Foster and Metcalfe 2001; Colander et 
al., 2004; World Economic Forum, 2013); we define a prospective approach 
as an approach that seeks to encompass the uncertainty and lack of accuracy 
of forecasting the future. It is difficult to embark on a prospective approach of 
this type to the monetary system– which is complex, dynamic and long-term– 
from a traditional perspective. 
Complexity Economics is based on the existence of so-called Complex 
Adaptive Systems (CAS): they make possible the development of well-defined, 
yet flexible, models that exhibit emergent behavior. In the words of Holland & 
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Miller (1991), such models can capture a wide range of economic phenomena 
precisely, even though the development of a general mathematical theory of 
complex adaptative systems is still in early stages. These authors remark that 
a major feature of these models is their ability to produce emergent behavior. 
That behavior can be expressed by words (which are flexible but often fail to be 
logically consistent) or by mathematical models (which are too rigid, but have 
a consistent structure). 
CAS are used in very different knowledge areas to explain the behaviour 
of such different systems as anthills, cities, ecosystems, physiological systems 
and the Internet. They all have a series of characteristics in common that lead 
them to behave as an adaptive, complex system. The International Monetary 
System perfectly matches the fundamental characteristics of a CAS (Arthur 
et al., 1997, Eidelson, 1997; Rojí-Ferrari, 2005; Holland, 2006; Beinhocker, 
2006; Helbing and Kirman, 2013): 
- Dispersed interaction: the IMS consists of independent interactive 
agents in the form of central banks, international organisations such as 
the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements, institutional investors, 
private investors and other stakeholders.  Those agents interact in a game 
situation and the decisions of each of them affect the forecasting and de-
cision-making of the others. For example, the volatility of exchange rates 
increases after the intervention of central banks (Dominguez, 1998), thus 
showing that despite their independence agents make decisions and react 
to the decisions of other members of the system.  
- Absence of a global supervisor: control is by means of coordination 
and competition mechanisms involving the agents themselves. Even though 
the system has regulatory institutions in the economic sphere, there is no 
central planner.
- Constant adaptation: decisions, actions, behaviour, strategy and poli-
cies are reviewed and adapted (as a repeated game) when the interactive 
agents deem this to be necessary. This is an inherent characteristic of the 
current financial network (Haldane, 2013).  If no such adaptation occurs 
the endogenous development of the system may lead to near collapse with 
no need for an external shock.
- Perpetual novelty niches: there are always new opportunities arising 
from constant innovation in both the monetary and economic systems. The 
term alludes to new behaviours, but also to new technologies such as so-
called fintech, which are changing the way in which money is moved around 
the world (Bruggink, 2016). Niches are continually created by new adapta-
tions (Holland and Miller, 1991).
- Non-equilibrium dynamics: given all the above characteristics, the 
system does not comply with any optimum point or global equilibrium, 
although adaptative systems may settle down temporarily at a local opti-
mum (Holland and Miller, 1991). 
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The factors of Complexity Economics fit into the theoretical framework of 
Knightian uncertainty of international economic policy. This type of uncer-
tainty, which is difficult to measure, is gaining importance in the constructiv-
ist literature of international economic policy exemplified by authors such as 
Blyth (2002) and Abdelal et al. (2010). We refer to ideas such as uncertainty, 
irrationality and confidence, which are fundamental in profiling the key aspects 
of the future of the IMS. Hence, this article does not seek an equilibrium model 
and the rationale is not quantitative assessment; it seeks rather to develop a 
qualitative approach.
4. stanDpoInt of the prospectIve approach to the InternatIonal monetary 
system 
All Complex Adaptive Systems have a history, evolve and their past is 
complicit in their present behaviour. Therefore, this article considers the back-
ground and current status of the dominant role of the USD so as to provide 
a basis for the current analysis and the medium- and long-term prospective 
approach (Figure 2). 
fIgure 2. a prospectIve approach to the InternatIonal monetary system from the perspectIve 
of complexIty economIcs
 
Source: own elaboration
The goodness of the IMS, taken as the suitability of its design in terms of 
the economic context, has varied significantly since it was set up after the 
two world wars. Establishing the USD as the anchor of the system at that time 
benefitted both the US and the rest of the countries: it enabled international 
economic relations to be restructured in an orderly fashion, guaranteed stabil-
ity at a difficult time and managed to drive economic growth; the dollar gener-
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ated economies of scale and network externalities and gave credibility to the 
system (Campanella, 2010). However, the goodness of the system has fallen 
gradually (the black area of the figure indicates a high level of goodness of 
the IMS, while the grey area shows a low level) as both circumstances and the 
interactive agents have changed: floating exchange rates, greater complexity 
and efficiency of financial markets, the appearance of the euro, key creditors in 
the Asia-Pacific zone and the Persian Gulf, greater relevance of private liquidity 
provision, etc. 
The IMS is currently based on confidence in the USD: the question of con-
fidence has become a key aspect for the future outlook of the IMS, but it 
is extremely difficult to model. The analysis has to be approached from the 
perspective of the interactive agents based on the guidelines set by psychol-
ogy (they have incomplete information, prejudices, commit errors, etc) –as is 
the case in Complexity Economics–, given that this may be decisive in their 
policies. When the IMS is analysed as a CAS the modern Triffin dilemma in the 
medium-term and the trend towards economic multipolarity in the long term 
emerge as two forces to which the system must necessarily adapt.
4.1. meDIum-term prospectIve approach: moDern trIffIn DIlemma 
In the medium term the greatest danger facing the IMS lies in the emer-
gence of a new Triffin dilemma, expressed in “modern” terms (Pozsar, 2011; 
Campanella, 2010; Fahri et al., 2011; Obstfeld, 2011; Zhou, 2009; Otero-
Iglesias, 2014). Although this idea enjoys broad academic support, we believe 
it has been undeservedly sidelined in the international agenda. Robert Triffin 
first posited the dilemma that bears his name in 1960. The original Triffin di-
lemma identified the paradox that the US, through the dollar, had to provide 
sufficient global liquidity to stimulate world economic activity, but in doing so 
it was harming the credibility of the dollar by removing its capacity to maintain 
dollar-to-gold convertibility at the established rate of 35 dollars per ounce 
(Triffin, 1960, 1978). The real economic flows that the analytical construct of 
the original Triffin dilemma tried to identify and understand pushed the IMS to 
the edge of collapse, with the dollar only being saved by the cancellation of 
its convertibility to gold. The US dollar thus came to be the central axis of a 
fiduciary monetary system, sustained by creditors’ confidence in the currency 
(Wolf, 2010). 
The Triffin dilemma cannot be rehashed in its 1960 form, but its contem-
porary relevance cannot be ignored, according to such leading figures as Zhou 
Xiaochuan (2009), governor of the People’s Bank of China, and Lorenzo Bini 
Smaghi (2011), a member of the executive board of the European Central 
Bank. The essential difference from the traditional approach is that the US’s 
creditworthiness, which is responsible for underwriting international liquidity, 
is now backed by fiscal capacity rather than gold. The key element is the fac-
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tor underpinning that confidence –be it gold or fiscal capacity– and much of 
the original arrangement therefore remains unchanged. Figure 3 shows the 
concept map of the original and modern Triffin dilemmas.
fIgure 3. trIffIn DIlemma, then anD noW. orIgInal trIffIn DIlemma (1960)
Source: own elaboration
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are the creation of the euro, the economic expansion of emerging economies 
since 2000 and the generation of international cash pools. That trust is now 
backed only by the mutual attitudes of different interactive agents towards 
American fiscal capacity; with gold removed from the equation the same guar-
antees are now being required of the dollar. The US is faced with the choice of 
either issuing more debt to meet global demand for dollars or reducing debt 
to improve its own fiscal capacity. If the US treasury continues to issue debt at 
the current rate without achieving solid growth, in the medium to long term US 
fiscal capacity will no longer be viewed as a guarantee, due to the reduction in 
the relative weight of the American economy on the world stage and the vast 
quantity of debt that it seeks to underwrite. However, if it stops issuing debt so 
as to relieve the burden on its fiscal capacity (that is to say, if it pursues its own 
domestic goals) it will harm the provision of international liquidity. 
Given that fiscal capacity is the cornerstone of all trust in the dollar and 
bearing in mind that any sign of weakness might be exaggerated on markets 
by the confidence multiplier effect (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), the modern 
Triffin dilemma will lead to a gradual erosion of confidence in the dollar in the 
medium term (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010; Helleiner, 2010; Kirshner, 2014). 
The extent of that loss of confidence is as relevant as it is uncertain, given that 
it will condition the action of the interactive agents and vice versa. However, 
even those authors who are most sceptical about the decline of the dollar, such 
as Prasad (2014), agree that there will be a falloff in demand for the currency.
Depending on how the perpetual novelty niches that tend to occur in CAS 
evolve, an entirely different situation might arise: on the one hand, the collapse 
of the IMS might be accelerated due to an increase in financial interconnectiv-
ity, the ever greater importance of non-bank institutions, an increase in the 
frequency, amplitude and duration of financial cycles and greater volatility of 
capital flows through a less and less controllable systemic risk. On the other 
hand, however, the situation might improve due to possible future novelty nich-
es: the supply of international liquidity might not necessarily require an accu-
mulation of current account deficits by the US, provided the FED is capable of 
offering secure short-term reserve assets and of investing in other less liquid 
ones securely using financial engineering (Mateos and Lago et al., 2009). Per-
petual novelty niches can condition the changes over time in the system itself 
or, as in the case above, can simply act as a safety valve, alleviating occasional 
imbalances caused by part of the debt issued. However, in no case can they be 
the definitive solution to the Triffin dilemma.
Thus, the IMS does not require an external shock of the type typical of 
balance of payments models to suffer a collapse. As a CAS, its own endog-
enous evolution will suffice: the very nature of the IMS means that either op-
tion –prioritising the provision of international liquidity or prioritising improved 
fiscal capacity– will erode confidence in the dollar. As Otero-Iglesias (2014) 
argues, the present IMS is prone to crisis, not so much because of potential 
external shocks –which is precisely the area on which IMS interactive agents 
and academics and experts in the field tend to focus– but because of its own 
endogenous evolution. 
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Despite the pressure exerted by the endogenous evolution of the system 
in the form of the Triffin dilemma, in the medium-term future the dollar’s in-
cumbency status (Eichengreen, 2011) will serve to maintain its position as the 
central axis of the IMS.
4.2. long-term prospectIve approach: unIpolar monetary system versus 
multIpolar economIc system 
In the long term, developments in the relative economic and financial im-
portance of different interactive agents on the international stage will heighten 
the endogenous evolution of the IMS: ever-greater tensions between an unipo-
lar IMS and an increasingly multipolar economic system will intensify the Triffin 
dilemma (Eichengreen, 2011). In this way, the mere passage of time will help to 
weaken dollar incumbency. 
America’s share in the world economy is declining in relative –though not 
absolute– terms, but its currency continues to occupy the central position in 
the IMS (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2011; Eichengreen, 2011; Otero-Iglesias, 2014). 
The global economic system is evolving towards multipolarity (IMF, 2016c), 
defined by the World Bank (2011) as “the existence of more than two growth 
poles  in  the  world  economy,  measured  as  the  degree  of  concentration 
of  growth  polarity  (the  lower  the  concentration,  the  greater  the  degree 
of multipolarity”. Figure 4 shows the current imbalance between the relative 
economic and monetary dimensions of the US, the European Monetary Union 
and the People’s Republic of China.
fIgure 4. monetary unIpolarIty vs economIc multIpolarIty
Source: own elaboration based on data from World Bank (2016), Eurostat (2014) and IMF (2016d)
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According to the World Bank’s multipolarity index (2011) the world is now 
more multipolar than at any time since 1968, and the trend is set to increase 
in the decades ahead. In general, growth in western economies has slowed, 
making room for other countries to play an ever greater role in the world econ-
omy: the emerging countries have now “emerged”. The World Bank (WB) con-
siders that by 2025 the six largest emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Russia) will account for over half of the world’s eco-
nomic growth activity. In a later report, the World Bank (2013) has published 
forecasts based on two scenarios: in the event of a gradual convergence in the 
level of wealth of emerging countries and the west, the contribution of emerg-
ing countries to global growth is expected to rise from 73 per cent in 2015 to 
nearly 87 per cent in 2030. In a less conservative scenario, they may account 
for 93 per cent of global growth.
Economic multipolarity translates into a long-term structural development 
in markets; emerging countries –which hold three quarters of official currency 
reserves– will become key interactive agents on financial markets (World Bank, 
2011). When the weight of the interactive agents varies in a CAS the system 
adapts to reflect their interests, depending on their relative weight. Such an ad-
aptation would force the unipolar IMS to follow in the footsteps of the multipo-
lar economic system (Eichengreen, 2011; Bini Smaghi, 2011). In a clear sign 
that this process has already begun, the BRICS have called for a renegotiation 
of the dollar’s status as the anchor of the global economy (Helleiner, 2008). 
The unilateral creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) is another sign of 
this adaptation. However, the initiative is driven only by interactive agents that 
are under-represented on key institutions such as the WB and the IMF and not 
by all agents. Once again, according to Complexity Economics, the dynamics 
of the system may lead to a situation of instability or even collapse with no 
need for any external shock if the system has not been adapted in its entirety, 
respecting the weight of each interactive agent.
5. proposal for the future: to focus on monetary multIpolarIty 
proactIvely anD cooperatIvely
If the IMS’s natural tendency as a CAS is to follow international economic 
and financial relations and this leads it in the direction of multipolarity, then 
surely it is better to take this path in an orderly fashion, without waiting for 
conflict. Complexity Economics allows only one way for the IMS to adapt and 
reconstruct itself: in the absence of a global authority it is essential to promote 
co-operation in order to build sustainable relations between interactive agents.
To cooperate, however, it is first necessary to address the mechanisms of 
cooperation. It is extremely difficult to reach decisions by consensus (Nash 
equilibrium) when the institutions created for that purpose do not properly 
reflect the relative economic and financial weights of the interactive agents, 
resulting in an imbalance in decision-making power (Güven, 2017). In order to 
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relieve tensions between the economic and monetary systems, and to propose 
policies and incentives for cooperation that will encourage external stability, it 
is essential to give greater representation to those countries whose economic 
weight has increased notably while their decision-making power has remained 
static. In decision-making on IMF policies, the G7 holds 41.33 per cent of the 
votes but the five countries that make up the BRICS block hold only 14.18 per 
cent (IMF, 2017). Given that the G7 (and primarily the US) is the main benefi-
ciary of the current IMS, it seems inevitable that nearly half of the body would 
vote down any reform that seeks to set the IMS on the road to multipolarity. 
Even efforts by the G7 to reform the IMS, such as France’s attempt during its 
G20 presidency in 2011, have been rejected by the US. This situation may 
have been acceptable in the mid-twentieth century, but it no longer reflects the 
real position of the interactive agents involved and it hampers the continuous, 
organic adaptation to new economic and financial conditions that any CAS 
requires. 
Despite the fact that the US, as an interactive agent in the system, has a 
guaranteed short-term military and geo-political hegemony (Drezner, 2010; 
Eichengreen, 2011) which enables it to maintain its opposition to possible 
changes in the IMS and to proper representation of countries in institutions 
such as the IMF and the WB, it is actually in the best interests of the US to work 
in cooperation. It is certainly true that in the current circumstances the US is 
the main beneficiary of the IMS. However, these circumstances are unlikely to 
hold in the medium to long term. That being so, it is in the US’s own interest to 
focus on reappraising the current system in an ordered and planned fashion, 
thus enabling it to continue occupying a predominant position; in contrast, if 
confidence in the dollar were to be lost in some currently unpredictable crisis 
the US might lose its status altogether.
Even if the US chooses not to co-operate, despite its political weight and 
its over-representation on the main institutions, the IMS must, like any CAS, in-
evitably adapt. In the long term, it might achieve multipolarity through further 
financial market development, capital account liberalisation and exchange rate 
flexibility in EMEs (Bini Smaghi, 2011). The only difference is that adaptation 
without cooperation will take longer and will produce conflicts between inter-
active agents that could lead to instability in the system. 
A number of roadmaps for monetary multipolarity have been advanced. 
However, there are great difficulties in getting them onto the international 
agenda, essentially because of underlying stumbling-blocks to cooperation. 
Proposals range from some with low levels of structural importance –for exam-
ple the creation of stability mechanisms such as a global liquidity guarantee 
network– to the use of SDRs in a modest or ambitious role. Other proposals 
for the medium term include a competitive multi-currency system revolving 
around the dollar, the euro and the yuan and the creation of regional monetary 
blocks. In the long term, the possibility of ascribing a more active role to SDRs 
and giving them a central role is also being considered, as is a global currency, 
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the introduction of which would entirely defuse the Triffin dilemma1. However, 
not even the least ambitious of these initiatives has prospered. Nonetheless, a 
CAS, such as the IMS cannot be strapped down in the long term, even if it can 
be slowed down by a single interactive agent. Without a focus on the road of 
cooperation, the action of the other interactive agents –primarily the emerg-
ing countries– will establish the path to the future, more slowly but inevitably.
Our purpose here is not to assess the best paths for adapting the IMS as 
a CAS but to stress the need to focus on that adaptation. The best path will 
be the one that emerges from cooperation based on “fair representation of 
countries” as interactive agents and grounded in a long term perspective rather 
than short-term interests (Boorman and Icard, 2011).
6. conclusIons  
Despite the dollar’s undisputed hegemony and although it still makes sense 
to invest primarily in it and trust in its security, Complexity Economics indicates 
that as things currently stand the IMS is prone to crisis. This corroborates the 
intuitive unease expressed by several experts (Zhou, 2009; Bénassy-Quéré et 
al., 2011; Boorman and Icard, 2011; Farhi et al., 2011; Eichengreen, 2011; 
Otero-Iglesias, 2014).
Previous literature has used general equilibrium economic models to ex-
amine issues related to the IMS. However, the Knightian uncertainty intrinsic 
to international economic relations makes it necessary to develop other ap-
proaches on which to base decision-making in this area. This study proposes a 
new framework based on Complexity Economics which enables a prospective 
examination to be made of the IMS as a Complex Adaptative System, that is a 
system characterised by different agents interacting in dispersed fashion which 
mutually condition each other, with no global overseer and with perpetual nov-
elty niches that force constant adaptation with little likelihood of achieving a 
balanced dynamic. This new framework makes it possible to analyse the risks 
inherent in the endogenous evolution of the IMS rather than focusing on exter-
nal shocks as a cause of instability and crisis, as has commonly been done in 
the traditional economy.
As a result of the action of the so-called interactive agents within the IMS, 
a trend towards two clear dynamics can be seen, one in the medium term and 
another in the long term, both of which lead to a decline in importance of the 
dollar. In the medium term a trend can be observed towards instability of the 
IMS arising from its own endogenous evolution, in the form of a modern Triffin 
dilemma –the incompatibility of fulfilling US national objectives while meeting 
the demands of international liquidity–. On the basis of Complexity Econom-
1 See Mundell (2005), Zhou (2009), Stiglitz et al. (2010), Otero-Iglesias (2010), Campanella (2010), 
Stiglitz (2011), Farhi et al. (2011), Obstfeld (2011), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2011) for a review of the 
different alternatives.
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ics, it can be concluded that the nature of the IMS as a CAS will eventually 
lead to an erosion of the confidence of interactive agents in the dollar in both 
options, with no need for any external shock. In the long-term, the endogenous 
factors of instability will be augmented by a clear move towards economic 
multipolarity, in opposition to the monetary unipolarity of the dollar. As a CAS, 
the IMS will necessarily have to adapt to these new circumstances.
The principal problem in the IMS as it stands at present is the difficulty 
that it faces in fulfilling the constant adaptation essential for any CAS. Histori-
cally, the US has been the main interactive agent in the IMS because its eco-
nomic, political and military superiority have conditioned all relations within 
the system. In any CAS, the action of each interactive agent conditions the 
actions of others, but in the case of the IMS a single interactive agent is holding 
back the necessary adaptation of the system to new circumstances through its 
“veto” power. The lack of a global supervisor, another essential feature of CASs, 
means that this situation of non-adaptation could be sustained in the medium 
term due to the incumbency of the dollar and the superiority of the US as an 
interactive agent, aided by the US’s voting strength on key institutions. In the 
long term, however, Complexity Economics predicts that more perpetual nov-
elty niches will emerge, opening up new possibilities and new economic condi-
tions that other interactive agents will capitalise on, diminishing the US’s cen-
tral role. Thus the greatest danger facing the IMS arises not from any potential 
external shock but from its own endogenous evolution, and it is on this aspect 
that both the interactive agents in the system and researchers and scholars 
should focus their attention.
Complexity Economics holds out only one path for the IMS to adapt and 
reconstruct itself: promoting co-operation between interactive agents for the 
construction of sustainable relations. That will first require working towards fair 
representation of the interactive agents on the institutions in which that coop-
eration is designed to take place, such as the IMF and the WB. Even if the main 
interactive agent, the US, were to decide not to co-operate, the adaptation of 
any CAS is inevitable. The only difference is that adaptation without coopera-
tion will take longer and will produce conflicts between interactive agents that 
could lead to instability in the system. In that case, surely it is better to take 
this path in an orderly fashion, without waiting for conflict to arise. 
The IMS should be designed not out of inertia but in response to the chal-
lenges that will have to be faced in the future. This study addresses those 
challenges using a new methodology that enables a comprehensive, long-term 
prospective approach to be taken. The future remains unwritten; it can be built 
by making the right decisions at the right time. And the right time is when all 
options are still available, including the best one. That is still the case today, 
but if decisions are taken reactively and not proactively the next time a crisis 
unfolds around the dollar, not all options may still be viable.
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